

# Dynamic Pricing for Controlling Age of Information (Aol)

keywords: Age of Information evolution, sampling cost, dynamic pricing optimization

## Key Research Questions

- To keep the freshness of content updates, many content providers (e.g., Waze and Crowdspark) now **invite and pay** the mobile users (with sensors embedded in their portable devices) to sense and send back real-time useful information.
- When motivating crowd to contribute real-time information, how to **trade off between sampling cost and Aol reduction**?
- Mobile users arrive from time to time with uncertainty and have **private sampling costs** unknown to the content providers.
- How should a content provider decide **dynamic pricing** to balance the monetary payments to users and the Aol evolution over time under **incomplete information** about users' arrivals and their private sampling costs?

## System model


Many content providers such as Waze and CrowdSpark now invite and pay the mobile crowd including smartphone users and drivers to sample real-time information frequently.



This translates to **high sampling cost** when inviting many sensors to sense and update, and should be also taken into account when managing the Aol.

As Aol  $A(t)$  changes over time, the compensation price  $p(t)$  at time  $t$  should be dynamic and **age-dependent** to best balance the Aol evolution and the sampling cost.

Yet this dynamic programming problem is challenging to solve especially under the incomplete information about users' arrivals ( $s(t)=0$  or  $1$ ) and sampling cost  $\pi$  in support  $[0, b]$  and CDF  $F(\cdot)$ .




- 1) The provider first announces dynamic price  $p(t)$  at the beginning of each time slot  $t$ ,
- 2) a user may arrive randomly in this time slot and (if so or  $s(t)=1$ ) he further decides to sample or not based on the price and its own sampling cost.
- 3) If the user appears and accepts to sample with  $\pi > p(t)$ , its sensor data is transmitted with fixed delay  $A_0$  to finally post in the provider's platform.

## Research Output

X. Wang & L. Duan, "Dynamic Pricing for Controlling Age of Information," to appear in *IEEE ISIT* 2019. <https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.01185>

## Key Approach and Results

Aol evolution over time under dynamic pricing in a discrete-time horizon:



Dynamics of the expected Aol:

$$A(t+1) = \alpha F(p(t))A_0 + (1 - \alpha F(p(t)))(A(t) + 1) \\ = A(t) - (A(t) - A_0) \frac{\alpha p(t)}{b} + \left(1 - \frac{\alpha p(t)}{b}\right). \quad (1)$$

The objective of the provider is to find the optimal dynamic pricing  $p(t) \in [0, b], t \in [0, \dots, T]$  to minimize the expected discounted cost:

$$U(T) = \min_{p(t) \in [0, b], t \in [0, \dots, T]} \sum_{t=0}^T \rho^t \left( A^2(t) + \frac{\alpha p^2(t)}{b} \right).$$

Tradeoff between Aol  $A^2(t)$  and expected payment  $\frac{\alpha p^2(t)}{b}$


**Constrained nonlinear dynamics**, challenging to solve analytically due to the curse of dimensionality (computation complexity  $O((\frac{b}{t})^T)$ ). To analytically solve the optimal price, we linearize the nonlinear Aol evolution in (1), by approximating the dynamic Aol reduction  $A(t) - A_0$  as a time-average term  $\delta = \frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho^T} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \rho^t (A(t) - A_0)$ :

$$A(t+1) = A(t) - \delta \frac{\alpha p(t)}{b} + \left(1 - \frac{\alpha p(t)}{b}\right). \quad \text{Fixed point } \delta \text{ exists.}$$

The optimal approximate dynamic pricing  $p(t), t \in [0, \dots, T]$  increases in  $A(t)$ :

$$p(t) = \frac{\rho M_{t+1}(\delta + 1) + 2\rho(\delta + 1)Q_{t+1}(A(t) + 1)}{2 + \frac{2\rho Q_{t+1}\alpha(\delta + 1)^2}{b}},$$

with  $p(T) = 0, Q_T = 1, M_T = 0. Q_t = 1 + \frac{\rho Q_{t+1}}{1 + \frac{\rho Q_{t+1}\alpha(\delta + 1)^2}{b}}, M_t = \frac{\rho(M_{t+1} + 2Q_{t+1})}{1 + \frac{\rho Q_{t+1}\alpha(\delta + 1)^2}{b}}$



Dynamic pricing  $p(t)$  first **increases** with Aol  $A(t)$  until both of them reach **steady-states**.

But when close to the end of the time horizon, **price decreases to  $p(t=T)=0$**  to save sampling expense, w/o worrying future Aol.

If we use the steady-state price  $p^\infty(t)$  without iteratively computing  $Q_t$  and  $M_t$ , the resulting expected discounted cost  $U^\infty(T)$  for finite horizon  $T$  approaches the optimal expected discounted cost  $U(T)$  as  $T \rightarrow \infty$ .

$$p^\infty(t) = \frac{\rho M(\delta + 1) + 2\rho(\delta + 1)Q(A(t) + 1)}{2 + \frac{2\rho Q\alpha(\delta + 1)^2}{b}}.$$

